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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of 
DAVEY SHARK, 88-A-9726. 
Peti timer, 
-against- 
NEW Y O N  STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-09-ST01 10 Index No. 1627-09 
Davey Shark 
Inmate No. 88-A-9726 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Mid-Orange Correctional Facility 
900 Kings Highway 
Wanvick, New York 10990-0900 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
'1 he tapitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(C. Harris Dague, Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Mid-Orange Correctioiial Facility. has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March 
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3,2008, which denied petitioner discretionary release on parole. The respondent opposes the 
petition seeking its dismissal. 
The petitioner, sentenced as a second violent felony offender following a guilty 
verdict, is currently serving a controlling term of2 1 -years to life for Murder, Second Degree. 
The circumstances underlying this offense involved the petitioner approaching the male 
victim from behind and then shooting him in the head with a .38 caliber pistol. 
On February 26,2008, the petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for his initial 
appearance, which had been postponed to allow the Parole Board to obtain the sentencing 
minutes. At that interview, the Parole Board discussed the instant offense. The petitioner 
explained to the Board that, prior to the shooting, there were rumors that the victim was 
going to kill the petitioner or have him killed because the victim mistakenly believed that the 
petitioner had been involved in an earlier kidnapping of a family member of the victim. The 
petitioner also denied his involvement in a drug gang as mentioned at his sentencing, and 
indicated that he had never been arrested for drugs. The Parole Board noted that the 
petitioner had three Tier I1 violations. Further, the Parole Board noted the petitioner’s efforts 
d~ p q g u , i n g  aiid his post-release plans. The Board also gave the petitioner an oppovrunity 
to discuss any matters he wanted to raise with the Parole Board. 
Folloiving the interview, the Parole Board released its decision, which provided: 
After a review of the record and interview, the panel has 
determined that if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without 
again violating the law and our release would be incompatible 
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with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious 
nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. This 
decision is based on the following factors: Your 110’s are: [sic]: 
Murder 2Ild, CPW 2”” and CPW 3 in which you approached your 
victim froin behind and shot the victiin once in the head causing 
his death. Your criminal history dates back to 1983 CPW. Note 
is made of your prograin and disciplinary record. The I/O is a 
violent and senseless execution which escalates your prior 
criminal behavior. You are clearly a violent and dangerous 
criminal. You pose a serious risk to society (Parole Board 
Release Decision Notice [dated 3-3-08], Answer, Exhibit F). 
The Parole Board held the petitioner for 24 months. 
The petitioner then administratively appealed this determination. Prior to receiving 
a determination on that appeal, the petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding, 
which Supreme Court, Albany County (McGrath, J.), dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. Thereafter, when the Appeals Unit did not determine the 
administrative appeal within a 120 days, the petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 
78 proceeding. Here, the petitioner effectively argues that the( 1)  determination is not 
supported by the record; (2) Parole Board predetermined the matter due to governmental 
policies; and (2) Parole Board violated the petitioner’s due process rights by relying solely 
on the instant omnses and holding him for an excessive amount oi time. In his reply, the 
petitioner also argues, inter alia, that the Parole Board relied on inisinformation in rendering 
its determination. 
First, the Court notes that. the sole consequence to the Appeals Unit failure to timely 
issue a decision is to perinit the petitioner to deem his or her administrative remedy to be 
exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial review of the underlying 
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determination (see 9 NYCRR 8006.4 [c]: Graham v New York State Division of Parole, 269 
AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 
636 [3rd Dept 20001). Otherwise, as stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's 
representative [I" (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dep:.. 
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
20011). Ifthe Parole Board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
the Board's determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 
supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
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v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69. 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State ofDivision of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner‘s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon 
release. In addition, the Parole Board allowed the petitioner an opportunity to discuss any 
other matter he felt warranted the Parole Boards’ attention (see Matter of Serna v New York 
State Div. of Parole, 279 AD2d 684,684-685 [3d Dept 20011). Contrary to claims made by 
the petitioner in his reply, the Parole Board did have the sentencing minutes before it and 
even referenced the minutes during the interview 
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law fj 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
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169, 171 [2d Cir. 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v 
H a i w p c k ,  605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir. 19791; Paunetto v Hainmock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SD NY 198 11; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole. 50 NY2d 69,75-76. 
supra. Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the 
inmate’s criines and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board 
of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863 [3rd Dept 1996]), 
as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd 
Dept 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept 19981). The Parole 
Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in 
determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Wise 
v A L ~ ~  1 urh SUZ L ) i t ~ u l i  ui 1’didc,  54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept 20081). Nor must the parole 
boaid i&ce die precise statutory language set Ljrth in the first sentence of Executive Law 
5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept 20061). In 
other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board inay give considerable weight to, or place 
particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, 
as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in 
determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,‘ 
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whether his or her 'release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,' and whether 
release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law"' 
(Matter ofDurio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept 20041, quoting 
Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
Further, the fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not 
confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v 
Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 1  14, 1 1  15 [3rd Dept 20081). The Parole Board is vested with the 
discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the 
sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd 
Dept 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd 
Dept 20071). Moreover, the record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision 
was predetermined consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of 
parole to all violent felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument 
(- see Matter of-Lue_Shinev Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept 20031; Matter of Perez v 
State of New York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept 20021; Matter of Jones v 
Travis, 293 AD2d 800, 801 [3rd Dept 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd 
Dept 20051, Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept 20061; Matter of Motti 
v Dennison, 38 AD3d 1030, 103 1 [3rd Dept 20071). 
Further, the Court rejects petitioner's argument that the additional hold of 24 months 
is excessive. "The scheduling of the reconsideration hearing was a matter for the Board to 
7 
[* 7]
determine in the exercise of its discretion. subject to the statutory 24-month maximum" 
(Matr+:t_I ) !  I I %IILI 1. I .  of Parole, 290 AD2d 907. 908 [3d Dept 20021). 
Nothing in the record suggests that the Parole Board abused its discretion in holding 
petitioner for the maximum statutory period (see ? 1  : i i L !  1 1  
Parole, 31 AD3d 898, 898 [3d Dept 20061; Matter of Absascal v New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 23 AD3d 740, 741 [3d Dept 20051). 
t i < .  t ) I  '>,L \ d h  ' I  I ) I  I, I 
i '~I, I I  & I :  -\ \Lii 1 1 1  I, \ I ~ ; I ~ .  111
Finally, although improperly raised for the first time in his reply papers, there is 
nothing in the record that establishes that the Parole Board relied on any misinformation in 
determining this matter (see Matter of Gardiner v New York State Div. of Parole, 48 AD3d 
871, 872 [3d Dept 20081). Otherwise, the Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining 
arguments and finds them to be without merit. Thus, since petitioner has failed to meet his 
burden of showing the Parole Board's determination exhibited irrationality bordering on 
impropriety, judicial interference is unwarranted (Matter of Silmon, 95 NY2d at 476; Matter 
of Farid, 17 AD3d at 754). 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the ~ o u r t  as a part of the record. The Court, by separalc: ouclt:, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is hereby dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judginent is being returned to the attorney for the respondent. All other papers 
are being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
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decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing. entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: September a ,2009 
Troy, New York 
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